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Abstract
Using a conviction-based measure, we find that local (state-level) public corruption exerts a negative effect on the lending 
activity of US banks. Our baseline estimations show that the difference in public corruption between, for example, Alabama, 
where corruption is high, and Minnesota, where corruption is low, implies that banks headquartered in the former state grant 
0.55% less credit (or $3.52 million for the average bank) ceteris paribus. Using proxies for relationship lending and monitor-
ing, we also find that these bank characteristics weaken the negative effect of public corruption on lending. These results 
are robust to tests that address endogeneity, to the use of perception-based measures of corruption, and after controlling 
for credit demand conditions. In further analysis, we show that these effects are more evident for smaller banks and banks 
operating in a single state. These findings provide evidence that public corruption could facilitate information asymmetry 
in the lending market and, thus, could hinder local development by reducing bank credit.
Keywords Bank lending · Public corruption · Information asymmetry
JEL Classification G21 · D73
Introduction
Does public corruption hinder bank lending activity? Can 
bank managers adopt strategies to diminish the impact, if 
any, of public corruption on bank lending? If yes, then what 
are these strategies? Answering these questions could be 
of importance for policymakers, banks, corporations, and 
citizens alike. Bank credit is crucially relevant for economic 
growth (De Gregorio and Guidotti 1995; Jayaratne and Stra-
han 1996), corporate development (Beck et al. 2008; Amore 
et al. 2013; Campello and Larrain 2015) and consequently 
for employment.
The extant literature provides grounds for the conjecture 
that public corruption could discourage banks from grant-
ing credit. Several studies associate public corruption with a 
deterioration of firm transparency and performance (Fisman 
and Svensson 2007; Dass et al. 2016; Zeume 2017; Brown 
et al. 2019). Less transparent borrowers induce information 
asymmetry in the lending market while weaker firm perfor-
mance, and hence a weaker ability to repay loans, increases 
the riskiness of the borrower pool.
Despite the above, studies that focus on the effects of local 
public corruption on bank lending are scarce and we aim to fill 
this gap in the literature. The US is an ideal testing ground to 
examine the relationship between public corruption and lend-
ing. Bank funding is important for US firms as it represents 
the majority of new corporate financing (Bharath et al. 2008; 
Hasan et al. 2014). Next, even though the deregulation of the 
US banking industry decreased and eventually eliminated, 
through the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, the barriers to interstate 
banking, the largest parts of the business of US banks remain 
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this 
article (https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1055 1-019-04410 -6) contains 
supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
 * Antonios Nikolaos Kalyvas 
 n.a.kalyvas@soton.ac.uk
 Theodora Bermpei 
 t.bermpei@essex.ac.uk
 Leone Leonida 
 leone.leonida@kcl.ac.uk
1 Finance Group, Essex Business School, University of Essex, 
Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK
2 Department of Banking and Finance, Southampton 
Business School, University of Southampton, Building 2, 12 
University Road, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK
3 King’s Business School, King’s College London, Bush 
House, 30 Aldwych, London WC2B 4BG, UK
 T. Bermpei et al.
1 3
at their headquarter state (Deng and Elysiani 2008; Goetz 
et al. 2016). Hence, local public corruption could be relevant 
for bank credit decisions across states. The US setting also 
allows us to segregate the effect of public corruption on bank 
lending given the relatively similar socioeconomic and regula-
tory frameworks across states. Further, in a US-focused study, 
we can use objective measures of public corruption that are 
based on corruption-related crime convictions and represent 
the ‘actual’ level of corruption to a large extent. Lastly, the US 
exhibits a significant cross-state variation in public corruption 
(Glaeser and Saks 2006). This alleviates concerns about pub-
lic corruption being less of an issue in the US because of its 
advanced country status. A comparison of Fig. 1 with Fig. 2 
shows an inverse relationship between corruption conviction 
rates and loans to assets ratios across the US states, and it moti-
vates a systematic analysis of the relationship between the two. 
Using both quarterly and yearly data on US commercial 
banks for the 1995–2013 period we show that public corruption 
decreases bank lending activity. This effect is both statistically 
and economically significant. As an illustration, the difference in 
public corruption between Alabama, where corruption is high, 
and Minnesota, where corruption is low, is roughly equivalent to 
one standard deviation. Our result implies that banks in Alabama 
grant 0.55% less credit (or $3.52 million for the average bank) 
than banks in Minnesota ceteris paribus. Taking into account 
that several banks are headquartered in each US state, these find-
ings denote that public corruption hampers access to bank credit 
and, thus, could hamper local economic development.
We carry out three exercises that show that supply-side con-
siderations of banks facilitate the negative relationship between 
public corruption and lending. The first is the inclusion in the 
models of state-level variables that help to control for credit 
demand. These comprise the state unemployment rate, the 
income per capita and particularly the state coincident index 
that reflects the general level of the state economic conditions in 
a single statistic. We also find that banks with lower quality loan 
portfolios are more hesitant to grant credit when public corrup-
tion is high. In this respect, we show that bank characteristics 
impact the effect of local public corruption on lending activity 
supporting that supply-side considerations drive our findings to 
a large extent. Finally, we show that public corruption makes 
banks more reluctant to grant commercial and real estate loans, 
which are more sensitive to local public corruption, in compari-
son with loans to individuals and agriculture loans.
Our analysis also suggests that certain bank character-
istics, which reflect strategies that banks adopt in order 
to overcome information asymmetry issues, moderate the 
negative relationship between public corruption and lending 
activity. Using established proxies for relationship lending 
and bank monitoring effort we show that these two bank 
characteristics weaken the negative association between 
local public corruption and lending activity.
We perform several robustness checks to support our main 
findings. Our results are robust to tests that address endo-
geneity, to different measures of public corruption, and to 
alternative clustering of the standard errors. We also perform 
further analysis to enrich our results. We show that the nega-
tive effect of local public corruption on lending is more pro-
nounced for smaller banks. This finding is consistent with the 
conjecture that smaller banks are more likely to lend locally. 
We also find that the negative effect of local public corruption 
on lending holds in both the pre-deregulation (i.e., pre-1994) 
and the post-deregulation periods (i.e., post-1994), while it is 
more evident for banks that operate in a single state.
This study adds to the extant literature in several ways. A 
wide stream of the literature investigates the drivers of lending 
activity because of the importance of bank credit for economic 
growth. Most of this research focusses on the effect of macro-
factors, such as monetary policy, and bank regulation on bank 
lending (e.g., Thakor 1996; Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004; 
Jiménez et al. 2012; Delis et al. 2014; Acharya et al. 2018). 
However, studies that associate local institutional quality with 
bank lending are scarcer. We contribute to this literature by 
showing that local public corruption exerts a negative and 
significant effect on lending activity. We also show that this 
Fig. 1  A map of the median corruption conviction rate by state from 
1985 to 2013
Fig. 2  A map of the median ratio of total loans over total assets by 
state from 1985 to 2013
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effect relates to credit supply considerations and not merely to 
credit demand. These findings show that public corruption is 
a source of information asymmetry in the local credit markets 
that discourages banks from providing credit.
In this way, we contribute to the more specialized stream of 
the banking literature that examines corruption-related issues 
in bank lending (Beck et al. 2006; Barth et al. 2009; Houston 
et al. 2011; Weill 2011; El Ghoul et al. 2016; Wellalage et al. 
2018). Most of these studies focus on how integrity in bank 
lending (i.e., loan officer bribery) affects the probability that 
firms will obtain loans in a cross-country context or focus 
on emerging economies. We complement these studies by 
showing that public corruption is also a factor that adversely 
affects the provision of bank credit even in the context of very 
advanced economies, such as in our case, the US, where insti-
tutional quality issues are considered less prevalent.
Furthermore, we provide evidence that proxies for 
relationship lending and monitoring weaken the negative 
relationship between public corruption and lending activ-
ity. Hence, we add to the studies which find that placing 
emphasis on borrower monitoring and on the acquisition of 
“soft” information on borrowers assists banks in overcom-
ing information asymmetry issues (Sufi 2007; Kysucky and 
Norden 2015; López-Espinosa et al. 2017). Our findings cor-
roborate the view in the context of information asymmetry 
stemming from local public corruption.
Finally, we add to the growing stream of US-focused 
research that explores the effects of local public corruption 
on firm-level outcomes (e.g., Dass et al. 2016; Smith 2016; 
Parsons et al. 2018; Brown et al. 2019). These studies find 
that local public corruption decreases firm transparency and 
value while it also induces unethical corporate behavior. 
Since these effects could aggravate the information asymme-
try concerns of lenders, our study is a sensible extension of 
this literature. We show that the negative effects of US pub-
lic corruption spill over to the credit market and from this 
standpoint could also restrict local economic development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we 
present our theoretical predictions and hypotheses. Second, 
we describe our data and methodology. Next, we present 
our key findings and main robustness checks. Following, we 
provide a summary of some additional robustness tests and 
further analysis. The final section concludes.
Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses 
Development
The Effect of Local Public Corruption on Bank 
Lending Activity
Local public corruption could negatively affect lending 
activity by increasing the information asymmetry between 
local borrowers and local banks. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
posit that a characteristic of corruption is its illegality and, 
consequently, its secrecy. Firms in areas with high local pub-
lic corruption could adopt more secrecy that would render 
them less informationally transparent. This may suggest a 
defensive move stemming from managers’ willingness to 
protect the firms’ assets from the expropriation instincts of 
public officials. It could also represent managers’ efforts to 
conceal their potential participation in corruption-related 
activities from investors. Some empirical studies show that 
US firms located in areas with a high level of public corrup-
tion are less transparent. Dass et al. (2016) find that firms 
in US states with higher levels of local public corruption 
exhibit lower informational transparency as measured by 
higher earnings manipulation and provision of less mana-
gerial guidance about their earnings. Dass et al. (2018) and 
Xu et al. (2019) find similar results.
Another potential reason for a corruption-induced 
increase in information asymmetries is the creation of a 
local culture of corruption that could legitimize unethical 
behavior. The literature of the economics of corruption 
shows that local public corruption increases the propensity 
of the local population to engage in corrupt and unethical 
behavior (Hauk and Saez-Marti 2002; Fisman and Miguel 
2007; Barr and Serra 2010). Fisman and Miguel (2007), for 
example, show that individuals originating from areas with 
high corruption are more likely to violate laws and regula-
tions. This local culture could also pervade local firms (Sch-
neider 1988). Parsons et al. (2018) provide evidence that 
local corporate misconduct is positively associated with the 
level of local public corruption in the US. In another study, 
Liu (2016) shows that firms that employ staff who originate 
from high corruption areas as key insiders are more likely 
to engage in accounting fraud. Other studies provide similar 
evidence regarding tax evasion and securities fraud litigation 
(Alon and Hageman 2013; DeBacker et al. 2015; Dass et al. 
2018). The above discussion suggests that banks located in 
areas with higher levels of local public corruption could face 
a less transparent pool of borrowers.
Local public corruption could also increase the informa-
tion asymmetry banks face due to the higher uncertainty 
regarding the cash-flows, and thus the ability to repay loans, 
of local firms. Empirical evidence from international studies 
shows that firms operating in areas with more corruption 
exhibit lower firm value, growth and profitability because 
of higher operating costs, lower efficiency and expropria-
tion risk (Fisman and Svensson 2007; Durnev and Fauver 
2011; Healy and Serafeim 2015; Lin et al. 2016; Van Vu 
et al. 2018). Smith (2016) shows that even US firms face 
local corruption-induced risks, such as expropriation risk. 
Brown et al. (2019) provide recent US-based evidence that 
local public corruption exerts a negative effect on firm value.
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Based on the above arguments, we conjecture that banks 
in areas (states) that exhibit a higher level of local public 
corruption would be more reluctant to grant credit. Thus, 
we formulate our main hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis1 (H1) Local public corruption could have a neg-
ative effect on the lending activity of banks in the US states.
The Mediating Role of Relationship‑Based Lending 
and Monitoring Effort on the Relationship Between 
Local Public Corruption and Bank Lending Activity
The Mediating Role of Relationship‑Based Lending
In terms of their lending activity banks could rely more on 
transaction-based or relationship-based technologies. Trans-
action-based lending technologies employ ‘hard’ informa-
tion on borrowers. This includes the borrowers’ accounting 
and financial statement information, the quality of their col-
lateral, and the use of the former as inputs in credit-scoring 
models. However, as we explain in the development of 
hypothesis H1, local public corruption could decrease the 
financial transparency of the local borrowers and the qual-
ity of their financial information. This, in turn, could raise 
doubts regarding the soundness of this type of information 
and its value to the transaction lender. On the other hand, 
relationship-based lending technologies depend on the col-
lection and processing of ‘soft’ proprietary information on 
borrowers. Such ‘soft’ information comprises information 
that is not easily quantifiable such as the borrower’s char-
acter and reliability (Berger and Black 2011). Banks source 
‘soft’ information on borrowers mostly through their numer-
ous contacts with them and through contacts with other par-
ties of the local community such as suppliers and clients. 
Notably, ‘soft’ information might be more difficult to obtain 
than ‘hard’ financial statement data, but the former is of 
great value to the lender when they deal with borrowers of 
lower ‘hard’ informational transparency. Considering that 
local public corruption could exacerbate information asym-
metries, relationships between lenders and borrowers that 
generate ‘soft’ information could be of importance in deci-
sions regarding credit provision.
Additionally, the literature suggests that small banks 
use ‘soft’ information more intensively than larger institu-
tions do since the former exhibit less complex organiza-
tional structures that allow the easier transmission of this 
type of information (Berger and Udell 2002; Liberti 2018). 
Smaller banks use a so-called ‘character approach’ in their 
credit decision making. This ‘character approach’ is based 
on non-financial characteristics stemming from personal 
interactions with loan applicants (Cole et al. 2004). Given 
that our sample includes the total of US commercial banks, 
the majority of which are relatively small banks, the use of 
relationship-based lending technologies that rely on ‘soft’ 
information could mitigate concerns regarding the informa-
tion asymmetry that local public corruption could induce.
To proxy for relationship-based lending, we use the ratio 
of its core deposits (i.e., transaction and saving deposits) to 
total assets. Banks use core deposits to fund informationally 
opaque relationship loans given that their elasticity about 
interest rates is low which makes them an appropriate source 
of funding for illiquid relationship loans (Chiorazzo et al. 
2018). Banks could use core deposits to finance these types 
of loans given that they are more difficult to be withdrawn 
as banks provide these depositors with additional transac-
tion and consulting services. Also, core deposits are largely 
insured and thus more stable compared to demand deposits 
(Drechsler et al. 2017). Thus, core deposits provide a stable 
route through which banks could build bank-depositor rela-
tionships that might lead to increased purchases of financial 
products (i.e., loans) made by depositors (DeYoung and Rice 
2004; Chiorazzo et al. 2018). Several studies lend support to 
the notion that core deposits and relationship-based lending 
are closely associated (Berger and Uddel 1995; Qi 1998; 
Berlin and Mester 1999) while other research shows that 
banks with a high level of core deposits specialize in more 
information-intensive loans (Black et al. 2007, 2010). Fol-
lowing the preceding discussion, we formulate our second 
hypothesis (H2):
Hypothesis 2 (H2) Banks that engage in more relationship-
based lending could be less affected in terms of lending 
activity by the adverse effects of local public corruption.
The Mediating Role of the Monitoring Effort
Strong monitoring effort is another bank feature that could 
attenuate the potential adverse effects of local public cor-
ruption on lending activity. Bank monitoring has long been 
the subject of previous research because banks benefit from 
economies of scale in monitoring and access to private infor-
mation on borrowers (Diamond 1984; Fama 1985). Besanko 
and Kanatas (1993) show that banks are special because 
they provide loans in combination with monitoring services. 
Bank monitoring effort could have several positive effects 
such as the increase in the chance of success of the bor-
rowers’ projects (Boot and Thakor 2000; Allen et al. 2011). 
A positive effect of a strong bank monitoring effort that is 
very relevant to this study is that it could play a govern-
ance role that could decrease the information asymmetry 
between banks and borrowers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
For example, Ahn and Choi (2009) show that bank monitor-
ing decreases the propensity of firms to engage in earnings 
manipulation. Therefore, strong monitoring could weaken 
the potential decrease in the quality of the borrowers’ finan-
cial information that local corruption could encourage. In 
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addition, Saunders and Song (2018) find that a strong bank 
monitoring effort exerts a chilling effect on the risk-taking 
behavior of borrowers. This could stem from the disciplining 
role of the negative consequences that lenders could impose 
on borrowers in case of violation of the loan contract terms. 
Such consequences comprise the redundancy of manag-
ers and the decline of further financing requests (see, for 
example, Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Ozelge and Saunders 
(2012). Thus, a strong monitoring effort could attenuate 
the potential that borrowers would engage in risky, unethi-
cal behavior, such as corporate misconduct and accounting 
fraud, which could stem from a local culture of corruption.
To proxy for monitoring effort, we employ the salary 
expenses to total non-interest expenses ratio of each bank. 
As monitoring effort is primarily human-oriented, and to 
the extent that salaries represent the capacity of employees 
in monitoring operations, then this ratio could gauge the 
level of monitoring resources and the expertise of these staff 
(Coleman et al. 2006; Lee and Sharpe 2009; Bhat and Desai 
2017). In more detail, Coleman et al. (2006) suggest that the 
two main assumptions that offer credence to this proxy of 
monitoring are that the loan officers with strong monitor-
ing expertise attract higher salaries and that the number of 
employees is readily related to the quantity of loan moni-
toring. Following the discussion above, we formulate the 
following hypothesis (H3):
Hypothesis 3 (H3) Banks that engage in stronger monitor-
ing could be less affected in terms of lending activity by the 
adverse effects of local public corruption.
Data, Research Design, and Descriptive 
Statistics
Sample
We obtain bank data from the bank regulatory database of 
WRDS. This database comprises quarterly accounting and 
headquarters location information for US banks via the Call 
& Thrifts financial reports. Further, we retain, following pre-
vious studies, bank-quarter observations where assets, loans, 
and capital have positive values. This process yields a final 
sample of 875,867 quarterly observations from 14,762 banks 
from 1985 to 2013. Note that the number of observations 
declines in the estimations because we use lagged values 
of the bank-specific control variables and sometimes it also 
depends on the type of the robustness test we perform to 
support our main analysis. Table 1 reports the definitions, 
measurement details, and sources of the main variables we 
use in the regression analysis.
Measures of Local Public Corruption
We measure local public corruption with the yearly number 
of corruption-related convictions across the US states from 
1985 to 2013. We normalize the number of these convictions 
by each state’s population (i.e., by 100,000 inhabitants for 
each state). This measure of public corruption has been used 
extensively in the literature (see, for example, Glaeser and 
Saks 2006; Campante and Do 2014; Smith 2016). We source 
the corruption data from the Public Integrity Section (PIN) 
Reports of the US Department of Justice (DoJ). The con-
victions in the PIN reports focus on crimes that involve the 
abuse of public trust by government officials and employees 
such as cases of bribery, fraud, political-contribution abuse, 
and illegal conflicts of interest.
The use of corruption-related convictions as a measure 
of public corruption exhibits some important advantages. 
Firstly, the conviction measure is more objective in com-
parison with the perception-based corruption measures that 
cross-country studies usually employ (Glaeser and Saks 
2006). Criticisms about the perception-based measures 
point to their lack of objectivity, short time frame, and the 
low survey response rate. Secondly, the conviction measure 
could compare the level of public corruption across states 
efficiently as it only applies to the US. This reduces issues 
arising from confounding factors such as the cultural and 
institutional differences that the cross-country measures may 
have (Fisman and Gatti 2002; Smith 2016). Furthermore, 
because federal authorities and the federal justice system 
handle the cases of public corruption, one can assume a 
moderate homogeneity of enforcement (Glaeser and Saks 
2006; Smith 2016) that enhances comparability. Thirdly, the 
corruption-related convictions involve both notable cases 
of corrupted officials holding offices at the highest level of 
government but also lesser-known public corruption cases 
of local government employees. Hence, this measure could 
capture the variation of the culture of corruption at the local 
(i.e., state) level adequately.
Despite the advantages of the conviction-based measure 
of public corruption, Goel and Nelson (2011) suggest that it 
represents the level of uncovered corruption. Hence, it may 
not show a portion of public corruption that the perception-
based indices could capture. Therefore, in robustness tests, 
we also use three perception-based measures of state-level 
public corruption. These are the illegal corruption percep-
tion-based index for the US states by Dincer and Johnston 
(2015), the “State Integrity Index” developed by the Center 
of Public Integrity, and the corruption perception index of 
Boylan and Long (2003). We provide details on these three 
perception-based corruption measures in Table 1.
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Table 1  Variables Definitions
Variables Definition of variables Source
Bank lending activity
 Ln Loans t The natural logarithm of the amount of total loans in 
thousands of $ normalized by the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI).
WRDS Bank Regulatory database/Call reports
 TL/TA t The ratio of total loans deflated by total assets. WRDS Bank Regulatory database/Call reports
Corruption variables
 STATE COR t The number of corruption-related convictions from the 
Department of Justice Public Integrity Section per 
thousand population of the state.
U.S. Department of Justice’s (DoJ’s) Public Integrity 
Section Reports
 DJ The illegal corruption perception-based index for the 
US states by Dincer and Johnston (2015). The index 
is derived from a survey of state reporters in 2014. It 
is based on the responses (i.e., perceptions) of state 
reporters to the following question: ‘How common 
is illegal corruption in the executive, legislative and 
judicial branches of the state government?’ The index, 
for each branch of the state government, ranges from 
5, suggesting that corruption is considered to be 
“extremely common”, to 1, which denotes that corrup-
tion is perceived to be “not at all common”. In terms 
of the aggregate illegal corruption at the state level, the 
index could range from three (lowest corruption) to 15 
(highest corruption). We normalize the index for each 
state by dividing it with the maximum possible value it 
can take (i.e., by 15).
Dincer and Johnston (2015)
 INVINT The inverse of the 2015 “State Integrity Index” by the 
Center of Public Integrity. This index evaluates the 
presence, efficacy and citizen access to anti-corruption 
mechanisms at the state level in the US. The numeric 
version of the index ranges from 0 to 100 with higher 
values denoting higher state integrity (i.e., less per-
ceived corruption). We use the inverse version of the 
index, by multiplying with − 1, for higher values to 
denote a higher level of perceived local public corrup-
tion.
Center of Public Integrity
 BL The corruption perception index of Boylan and Long 
(2003). This measure is based on the feedback from 
a survey of the state house reporters about the public 
corruption in each state. The survey was conducted in 
1999 and the index (BL) ranges from one (low corrup-
tion) to seven (high corruption).
Boylan and Long (2003)
 MEAN COR The time-series mean of state-level corruption for each 
state. (Used in estimations in the Internet Appendix)
U.S. Department of Justice’s (DoJ’s) Public Integrity 
Section Reports
 RANK COR The rank of the time-series mean of state-level corrup-
tion. (Used in estimations in the Internet Appendix)
U.S. Department of Justice’s (DoJ’s) Public Integrity 
Section Reports
Instruments for corruption
 CAPIS1920 The measure of state-capital isolation, adjusted for state 
size and shape, for the earliest year available in the 
study of Campante and Do (2014), i.e., 1920. The 
state-capital isolation variable ranges from 0 to 1 with 
lower (higher) values denoting higher (lower) capital 
isolation
Campante and Do (2014)
 FOIA A dummy variable that takes the value of one for the 
years beyond the seventh year after a state has transi-
tioned from weak to strong freedom of information act 
(FOIA) laws while it takes the value of zero up to the 
seventh year after the transition
Cordis and Warren (2014)
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Regression Specification
We test our main hypothesis, H1, using the following empiri-
cal model:
where i, s, t denote the bank, the state and time, respectively. 
To capture Bank lending activityi,s,t we employ the natural 
log of the value of total loans (Rodnyansky and Darmouni 
2017; Acharya et al. 2018; Cheng et al. 2018).1 We also 
provide estimations that use the total loans deflated by total 
assets as a second measure of lending activity. The measure 
of local public corruption, State corruptions,t , stands for the 
rate of corruption-related convictions per hundred thousand 
(100,000) inhabitants in states, as per Smith (2016). Further, 
we use the contemporaneous value of the local public cor-
ruption measure because the conviction data have an inher-
ent lag from the corruption-related crime (Smith 2016). 
The vector Bank controlsi,s,t−1 comprises bank-specific con-
trol variables such as bank size, return on assets, liquidity, 
and capitalization. We use the lagged values for the bank 
(1)
Bank lending activityi,s,t = 훽1State corruptions,t
+ 훽2Bank controlsi,s,t−1
+ 훽3State controlss,t
+ 휔s + 휇i + 휏t + 휀i,s,t
controls in order to attenuate simultaneity issues. Further, 
the vector State controlss,t includes state-level characteristics 
that control for personal income, unemployment, and popu-
lation. The use of these state controls is important because 
they can affect bank lending activity and also may corre-
late with local public corruption (Glaeser and Saks 2006; 
Smith 2016). Lastly, we saturate the model with bank, state, 
and time fixed effects, 휇i , 휔s, and 휏t, respectively (DeYoung 
et al. 2018; Agarwal et al. 2019). We provide the summary 
statistics of the variables, the median values of public cor-
ruption by state, and the correlation matrix in Tables 2, 3 
and 4 respectively.  
To test our secondary hypothesis, H2, we augment model 
(1) above as:
where 훽4 is the coefficient of interest. This is the coefficient 
of the interaction between local public corruption and the 
core deposits to total assets ratio (COR DEP/TA i,s, t−1), 
which is the proxy for relationship-based lending. We con-
jecture that this variable could mediate the relationship 
between local public corruption and bank lending activity 
and we expect this coefficient to be positive. Similarly, to test 
for H3, we augment our model (1) and estimate
(2)
Bank lending activityi,s,t
= 훽1State corruptions,t + 훽2Bank controlsi,s,t−1
+ 훽3State controlss,t + 훽4Core Deposits∕Total Assetsi,s,t−1
× State corruptions,t + 휔s + 휇i + 휏t + 휀i,s,t
Table 1  (continued)
Variables Definition of variables Source
Bank variables
 L.ROA The lagged ratio of net income to total assets WRDS Bank Regulatory database/Call reports
 L. CASH RATIO The lagged ratio of cash holdings to total assets WRDS Bank Regulatory database/Call reports
 L. E/TA The lagged ratio of equity to total assets WRDS Bank Regulatory database/Call reports
 L. SIZE The lagged natural logarithm of the $ value of total 
assets normalized by the CPI
WRDS Bank Regulatory database/Call reports
 L. CORE DEP/TA The lagged ratio of core deposits to total assets WRDS Bank Regulatory database/Call reports
 L. SAL EX/TE The lagged ratio of the total amount of salary expenses 
to total assets
WRDS Bank Regulatory database/Call reports
 L. LLP/TL The lagged ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans WRDS Bank Regulatory database/Call reports
State variables
 UNEMP t The state unemployment rate Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLR)
 POPUL t The natural logarithm of state population US Census Bureau
 INCOME t The natural logarithm of state-level per-capita income Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
 COIN t The coincident index for each state in each year-quarter. 
The index provides in a single statistic the economic 
conditions for each state. It comprises information 
from nonfarm payroll employment, average hours 
worked in manufacturing by production workers, the 
unemployment rate, wage and salary disbursements 
deflated by the consumer price index (US city aver-
age). Higher values denote better economic conditions
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
1 The variable is taken as thousands of $ deflated using the CPI.
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where the salary expenses to total non-interest expenses 
(SAL EX/TE i,s,t−1) is the proxy for bank monitoring effort. 
Because we expect that higher monitoring reduces, on aver-
age, the negative impact of corruption upon bank lending 
activity, we expect this interaction to have a positive sign.
As for the frequency of the data, t, in our main analysis, 
we report results by using both quarterly and annual data. 
There are several reasons for the choice of using quarterly 
data. The first is that the original frequency of the data in 
Call reports is quarterly, and much of the research focus-
sing on US bank lending tends to use quarterly data (e.g., 
Delis et al. 2014; Kim and Sohn 2017; Acharya et al. 2018). 
Secondly, bank managers take into account the quarterly 
economic conditions and bank balance sheet characteristics 
when they decide to grant lending (Delis et al. 2014). This 
is rational since bank lending decisions usually have a small 
time frame. Agarwal and Ben-David (2018), for example, 
show that the time interval between a loan application and 
a decision to grant credit is less than 2 months. Thirdly, 
two of our hypotheses (H2 and H3 as specified in Eqs. (2) 
and (3) respectively) involve interactions between the pub-
lic corruption measure that exhibits yearly variation and 
the bank characteristics, which display quarterly variation. 
These interaction terms then also display quarterly varia-
tion. Therefore, the use of quarterly data increases estima-
tion efficiency due to the higher number of observations. 
Furthermore, the higher frequency of the two bank-specific 
characteristics helps to reduce the potential collinearity 
between the three regressors—i.e., each of the two bank-
specific characteristics, state corruption, and their interac-
tion. Hence, for each quarter in a year, we assign the yearly 
state-specific corruption.2
We, however, take into account that local public corrup-
tion exhibits yearly variation by state and we also provide 
results from estimations that use yearly data. To this end, we 
(3)
Bank lending activityi,s,t
= 훽1State corruptions,t + 훽2Bank controlsi,s,t−1
+ 훽3State controlss,t + 훽4Salary Expenses∕
TotalNon Interest Expensesi,s,t−1
× State corruptions,t + 휔s + 휇i + 휏t + 휀i,s,t
use yearly measures based on the 4th quarter of each year as 
in Berger and Udell (2004). The authors indeed argue that 
this quarter call is generally considered the most accurate as 
it smooths out short-term fluctuations in lending.3
Main Results
Baseline Results
Table 5 depicts the findings from the baseline estimations. 
Panel A reports results from models that use quarterly data, 
while the estimations in Panel B use yearly frequency data. 
The first three models of Panel A and Panel B of Table 5 use 
the natural log of total loans as the lending activity variable, 
while in the fourth model of each panel we employ the total 
loans deflated by total assets. All the models of Table 5 are 
saturated with bank, state, and time (year-quarter in Panel 
A and year in Panel B) fixed effects.
Regarding the estimations that use quarterly data, we start 
with a simple regression of local public corruption on the 
lending activity variable (Ln Loans) in model 1 of Panel A 
of Table 5. The result shows that local public corruption has 
a negative and significant association with lending activity at 
the 1% level. In model 2 of Panel A of Table 5, we extend 
the specification of model 1 with the addition of the lagged 
bank-level controls. The findings from this model still indicate 
a negative and significant association of local public corrup-
tion with bank lending activity at the 1% level. We further 
extend the specification with the addition of state-level control 
variables to reach the full model of Eq. (1). The findings from 
the full specification are available in model 3 of Panel A of 
Table 5. The results indicate that local public corruption retains 
a negative and significant association with bank lending activ-
ity at the 1% level after controlling for bank-level and state-
level characteristics. Overall, these findings are consistent with 
hypothesis H1, which predicts that banks located in states with 
a higher level of public corruption would reduce lending activ-
ity. We obtain similar results in model 4 of Panel A of Table 5 
when we use the total loans deflated by total assets (TL/TA) 
as the lending activity variable. The findings we obtain from 
the analogous models that use yearly frequency data are also 
similar (see all models of Panel B of Table 5).
To infer the economic significance of our results, we use 
the difference between a bank with headquarters in Ala-
bama, where public corruption is high (i.e., 0.409; see mean 
value of Table 3), and a bank in Minnesota, where public 
corruption is low (i.e., 0.148; see mean value of Table 3). 
The difference between the two states (0.261) is comparable 
2 Using the same values of a lower frequency explanatory variable 
to match observations of a higher frequency dependent variable is 
not uncommon in the banking literature. Anginer et  al. (2014), for 
example, use as explanatory variables bank regulation measures, 
which exhibit a triennial frequency, to models where the dependent 
variables are annual bank performance measures. The justification the 
authors provide is that bank regulations are slow to change in a short 
time frame. Similarly, public corruption, being an institutional quality 
characteristic, is not likely to change significantly during the quarters 
of the same year. Hence, the approach of assigning the yearly values 
of local public corruption to the four quarters of the same year is con-
sistent with the approach of Anginer et al. (2014).
3 We thank an anonymous referee for motivating us to perform esti-
mations based on yearly data.
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to a one standard deviation (0.252) increase in STATE COR 
(see Table 5). By employing the coefficient in model 3 of 
Panel A of Table 2, we find that a bank in Alabama grants 
0.55% less credit ((e(0.0211 × 0.261) − 1) × 100) than a bank in 
Minnesota, ceteris paribus. The average bank in the sam-
ple grants around $637 million  (e(11.062)) of credit. Hence, 
this means a decrease in granted credit by $3.52 million 
($3.52 = 0.55%  × $637) for the average bank. This is an eco-
nomically important effect in terms of the local credit sup-
ply, particularly if one considers that each state has several 
banks that tend to lend locally. Hence, these results provide 
evidence that local public corruption could obstruct local 
economic development by decreasing credit availability.
Regarding the control variables, the results are gener-
ally consistent across the models of Panel A and Panel B of 
Table 5. We find that larger banks exhibit stronger lending 
activity. The effect of the natural log of total assets (SIZE) 
has a positive and significant effect on lending activity at 
the 1% level. Profitability, as proxied by the return on assets 
ratio, is found to exert a positive and significant effect on 
bank lending at the 1% level in models 2–4 of Panel B of 
Table 5. This finding is consistent with the view that higher 
profits induce banks to increase credit supply. We also find 
that banks with higher equity to assets ratio (E/TA) display 
weaker lending activity. In the majority of the models of 
Table 2, the effect of the equity to assets (E/TA) on lending 
activity is negative and significant at the 1% level. These 
findings denote that equity capital induces banks to be less 
aggressive in terms of lending. This could imply that when 
shareholders have more of their money at stake, they moni-
tor banks more closely and bank managers become more 
cautious in terms of lending activity (Berger and DeYoung 
1997). Liquidity, as measured by the cash to total assets ratio 
(CASH RATIO), also has a negative association with bank 
lending activity. As far as the state-level controls are con-
cerned, our results show that banks in less rich states exhibit 
weaker lending activity. The effect of the state-income per 
capita (INCOME) on bank lending activity is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Our results also show 
that the state unemployment rate (UNEMP) displays a nega-
tive and significant association with lending activity (see 
model 3 of Panel A and Panel B of Table 5). Finally, we 
find that the natural log of the population has a negative 
association with lending activity. The findings for the control 
variables are generally consistent with the findings of other 
studies (see, for example, Rodnyansky and Darmouni 2017; 
Acharya et al. 2018; Cheng et al. 2018).
Table 2  Summary statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th
Bank lending activity
 Ln Loans 875,867 11.062 1.430 10.138 10.920 11.794
 TL/TA 875,867 0.566 0.155 0.468 0.582 0.678
Corruption variables
 STATE COR 875,867 0.321 0.252 0.151 0.272 0.425
 DJ 859,015 0.448 0.116 0.367 0.433 0.533
 INVINT 875,867 − 63.020 4.169 − 67.000 − 62.000 − 60.000
 BL 862,590 3.395 1.064 2.600 3.333 4.500
 MEAN COR 875,867 0.321 0.146 0.187 0.277 0.409
 RANK COR 875,867 24.799 14.135 11.000 23.000 38.000
Bank variables
 L.ROA 653,306 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.008
 L.CASH RATIO 653,626 0.067 0.061 0.033 0.049 0.078
 L.SIZE 653,691 11.674 1.311 10.814 11.519 12.308
 L.E/TA 653,691 0.098 0.039 0.076 0.090 0.110
 L.LLP/TL 653,306 0.003 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.003
 L.SAL/EXP 653,300 0.813 0.560 0.447 0.738 1.062
 L.COR DEP/TA 653,540 0.128 0.067 0.084 0.115 0.156
State variables
 POPUL 875,867 15.531 0.902 14.930 15.456 16.273
 UNEMP 875,867 5.492 2.196 4.400 5.500 6.800
 INCOME 875,867 18.704 1.030 18.020 18.757 19.413
 COIN 875,867 76.801 16.246 63.647 75.160 90.293
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Accounting for Loan Demand
The baseline models show a negative and significant asso-
ciation between local public corruption and bank lending 
activity. In this section, we attempt to discern whether this 
association stems merely from a decrease in the demand for 
credit or also because of the lending behavior of banks—
i.e., because of credit supply considerations. In the baseline 
estimations, we have included control variables that could 
capture, to some extent, the demand for credit at the state 
level. These are the level of state unemployment and the 
state-income per capita. We proceed with the inclusion in 
the baseline model of an additional variable that could cap-
ture the demand for loans. This is the coincident index for 
each state in each year-quarter. The Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia produces this index and makes it available 
online.4 In a single statistic the index provides the economic 
conditions for each state5 with higher values denoting better 
state economic conditions. We conjecture that the coincident 
index could serve as a proxy for local loan demand. The data 
on the coincident index are monthly. We take the average for 
each year-quarter to construct a quarterly coincident index 
(COIN) to include in the specifications that use quarterly 
data. The results from these models are available in Panel 
A of Table 6.
In model 1 of Panel A of Table 6, we find that the coinci-
dent index (COIN) has a positive and significant association 
with the natural log of total loans (Ln Loans). This finding 
is consistent with the notion that, in times of improved eco-
nomic conditions, the demand for credit increases. However, 
we also observe that the association between local public 
corruption and the log of total loans (Ln Loans) remains 
negative and significant at the 1% level. Similarly, in model 
2 of Panel A of Table 6, which uses the total loans deflated 
by total assets (TL/TA) as proxy for lending activity, the coef-
ficient on the local public corruption remains negative and 
significant at the 1% level after controlling for loan demand 
with the use of the coincident index (COIN). The results 
are similar in the analogous models 1 and 2 of Panel B of 
Table 6 that use yearly frequency bank data together with a 
yearly version of the coincident index (COIN).
Another way to discern whether credit supply considera-
tions play a role in the negative association between local 
public corruption and lending activity is to use interactions 
of the corruption variable with bank characteristics (see, for 
example, Kashyap and Stein 2000; Delis et al. 2014). This 
strategy is based on the notion that if the negative associa-
tion between local public corruption and lending is driven 
solely from the demand for credit, then it should not depend 
on bank characteristics. On the other hand, if credit supply 
considerations also drive the negative relationship between 
corruption and lending activity, then this would be more 
evident in banks with specific characteristics. This implies 
that local public corruption induces lending activity to differ 
between banks with different characteristics. One such char-
acteristic is the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio. We expect 
that banks with loan portfolios of lower quality would be 
more hesitant to grant credit when they are located in states 
with a higher level of local public corruption to avoid a fur-
ther deterioration of their asset portfolio. To test this predic-
tion, we run specifications that include the interaction term 
between the local public corruption variable and the ratio 
of the lagged loan loss provisions to total loans (LLP/TL), 
which serves as a proxy for the quality of the loan portfolio.
Table 3  Corruption by state
The table shows the median and average number of corruption-
related convictions per thousand population for the period covered in 
the study (1985–2013). All variables are defined in Table 1
State Median Mean State Median Mean
Alabama 0.424 0.409 Nebraska 0.115 0.172
Alaska 0.493 0.741 Nevada 0.204 0.215
Arizona 0.146 0.230 New Hampshire 0.090 0.110
Arkansas 0.197 0.230 New Jersey 0.290 0.305
California 0.265 0.279 New Mexico 0.209 0.252
Colorado 0.155 0.181 New York 0.435 0.465
Connecticut 0.243 0.267 North Carolina 0.189 0.196
Delaware 0.152 0.289 North Dakota 0.471 0.591
Florida 0.361 0.395 Ohio 0.375 0.405
Georgia 0.386 0.386 Oklahoma 0.241 0.277
Hawaii 0.250 0.350 Oregon 0.075 0.088
Idaho 0.203 0.247 Pennsylvania 0.368 0.371
Illinois 0.473 0.513 Rhode Island 0.200 0.274
Indiana 0.244 0.259 South Carolina 0.200 0.305
Iowa 0.143 0.186 South Dakota 0.469 0.653
Kansas 0.183 0.187 Tennessee 0.428 0.492
Kentucky 0.384 0.453 Texas 0.237 0.237
Louisiana 0.699 0.687 Utah 0.095 0.139
Maine 0.301 0.291 Vermont 0.160 0.172
Maryland 0.306 0.324 Virginia 0.464 0.466
Massachusetts 0.249 0.313 Washington 0.075 0.108
Michigan 0.182 0.224 West Virginia 0.332 0.386
Minnesota 0.116 0.148 Wisconsin 0.169 0.173
Mississippi 0.571 0.661 Wyoming 0.357 0.514
Missouri 0.299 0.318
Montana 0.500 0.557 Total 0.272 0.321
4 https ://www.phila delph iafed .org/resea rch-and-data/regio nal-econo 
my/index es/coinc ident .
5 It comprises information from nonfarm payroll employment, aver-
age hours worked in manufacturing by production workers, the unem-
ployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the 
consumer price index.
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The results from this exercise using quarterly data are 
available in models 3 and 4 of Panel A of Table 6. In model 
3 of Panel A, the interaction between local public corruption 
(STATE COR) and the loan loss provisions to total loans ratio 
(LLP/TL) is negative and significant. In addition to this, the 
individual effect of local public corruption on the log of total 
loans (Ln Loans) is also negative and significant at the 1% 
level. The results from model 4 of Panel A that uses the total 
loans deflated by total assets (TL/TA) as an alternative lend-
ing activity variable are similar. These findings show that the 
negative effect of local public corruption on lending activ-
ity strengthens for banks with lower asset quality. We further 
extend this test with the inclusion of state*year-quarter fixed 
effects. The inclusion of this type of fixed effects in the mod-
els could capture the demand for credit in each state in each 
quarter. In the presence of state*year-quarter fixed effects, we 
cannot include state-level variables that exhibit time hetero-
geneity because they would be perfectly correlated with these 
fixed effects. Therefore, we drop the state variables such as 
the local public corruption measure from the specifications. 
However, in the presence of state*year-quarter fixed effects, 
the interaction between the loan loss provisions to total loans 
ratio (LLP/TL) and the local public corruption measure can 
still be identified. In models 5 and 6 of Panel A, this interac-
tion displays a negative and significant relationship with the 
lending activity variables. Hence, lending activity declines 
for banks that have lower loan portfolio quality in states with 
higher local public corruption. In models 5 and 6 of Panel B 
of Table 6, we repeat this exercise by using yearly frequency 
and data and we obtain similar results.
Table 5  The relationship between local public corruption and bank lending activity: baseline estimations
This table shows results from regressing bank lending activity on state-level public corruption after controlling for bank- and state-level character-
istics (models 2, 3 and 4 of Panel A and Panel B). Table 1 presents full definition and measurement details of all variables. Significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels is represented by *, **, and ***, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The prefix (L.) denotes lagged variables
Frequency of 
data
Panel A Panel B
Quarterly Yearly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Ln loans Ln loans Ln loans TL/TA Ln loans Ln loans Ln loans TL/TA
STATE COR − 0.0303*** − 0.0173*** − 0.0211*** − 0.0105*** − 0.0331*** − 0.0174*** − 0.0243*** − 0.0107***
(0.00792) (0.00362) (0.00355) (0.00145) (0.00785) (0.00412) (0.00402) (0.00146)
L.ROA − 0.0745 − 0.141 0.0848 1.016*** 0.891*** 0.191**
(0.180) (0.159) (0.0796) (0.300) (0.270) (0.0826)
L.CASH RATIO − 0.670*** − 0.668*** − 0.277*** − 0.479*** − 0.480*** − 0.197***
(0.0451) (0.0450) (0.0109) (0.0398) (0.0398) (0.0117)
L.SIZE 0.973*** 0.978*** 0.00950*** 0.880*** 0.885*** 0.00753***
(0.00558) (0.00575) (0.00204) (0.00750) (0.00758) (0.00210)
L.E/TA − 0.00932*** − 0.00920*** − 0.00391*** − 0.00131 − 0.00101 − 0.00342***
(0.00154) (0.00153) (0.000260) (0.00128) (0.00127) (0.000319)
INCOME 0.367*** 0.158*** 0.392*** 0.108***
(0.0345) (0.0136) (0.0365) (0.0145)
UNEMP − 0.00251** 4.63e − 05 − 0.00733*** − 0.000391
(0.00117) (0.000454) (0.00117) (0.000475)
POP − 0.650*** − 0.302*** − 0.571*** − 0.235***
(0.0534) (0.0211) (0.0562) (0.0222)
Constant 11.84*** 0.0478 3.384*** 2.239*** 11.26*** 0.710*** 2.394*** 2.101***
(0.338) (0.0790) (0.611) (0.241) (0.295) (0.0982) (0.687) (0.253)
Observations 875,867 651,585 651,585 651,585 215,631 201,537 201,537 201,537
R2 0.411 0.844 0.845 0.236 0.440 0.799 0.800 0.235
Number of 
banks
14,762 14,277 14,277 14,277 14,001 13,069 13,069 13,069
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Year 
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Another way to discern whether supply-side considerations 
play a role in the negative relationship between local public 
corruption and lending is to examine different types of loans. 
Our theoretical arguments (e.g., increase in information asym-
metry due to an increase in firm opacity) that banks in areas 
with higher local public corruption decrease lending activity 
relate mostly to corporate loans. Hence, we expect that in 
the presence of high public corruption, banks would be more 
hesitant to grant commercial and industrial loans because 
these loans could be particularly vulnerable to the potential 
adverse effects of local public corruption. Similarly, we expect 
that real estate loans could also be affected adversely by local 
public corruption, given that real estate loans also include real 
estate loans for commercial purposes. On the other hand, we 
expect the lending activity about other types of loans – such as 
loans to individuals and agriculture loans—to be less sensitive 
to local public corruption. The results of this analysis using 
quarterly data are available in Panel A of Table 7.
In models 1 and 2 of Panel A of Table 7, we find that local 
public corruption exerts a negative and significant effect at 
the 1% level on the natural log of commercial and industrial 
loans and the natural log of the real estate loans respec-
tively. On the contrary, we find a much weaker relationship 
between local public corruption and bank lending for other 
types of loans, such as loans to individuals and agriculture 
loans (see models 3 and 4 of Panel A of Table 7). The results 
from the models that use yearly frequency data are similar 
(see all models of Panel B of Table 7). Altogether, the above 
findings point to the conclusion that the negative association 
between bank lending and local public corruption also works 
through the bank supply-side channel.
The Mediating Effect of Relationship‑based Lending 
and Monitoring Effort
Our previous specifications show that local public corrup-
tion decreases bank lending. Yet, this effect may vary with 
bank heterogeneity stemming from the strategies that banks 
use to overcome corruption-induced information asymme-
try issues. Thus, in this section, we test whether banks that 
use more relationship-based lending and engage in stronger 
monitoring could attenuate the adverse effect of local pub-
lic corruption on lending activity (i.e., hypotheses H2 and 
H3). For this test, we run models that include the interaction 
term between the ratio of core deposits to total assets (salary 
expenses to the total non-interest expenses) as a proxy for 
relationship-based lending (monitoring effort) and the local 
public corruption variable.
We run models using both quarterly (Panel A) and yearly 
(Panel B) frequency data. The results from this exercise are 
available in Tables 8 and 9.
In model 1 of Panel A of Table 8, the results show that the 
interaction between local public corruption (STATE COR) 
Local Public Corruption and Bank Lending Activity in the United States 
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and the core deposits to total assets (CORE DEP/TA) has 
a positive and significant effect on the log of total loans 
(Ln loans) at the 5% level. Further, in model 2 of Panel 
A of Table 8, we include state*year-quarter fixed effects 
to account for all the state-level characteristics that vary 
across time. In this way, we take into account any omitted 
variable bias stemming from other state characteristics that 
could correlate with local public corruption as well as loan 
demand. As a result, we drop all the state-level time-variant 
variables from the specification, including the corruption 
variable, as it correlates perfectly with the state*year-quarter 
fixed effects. However, the model can still identify the inter-
action between local public corruption (STATE COR) and 
the core deposits to total assets (CORE DEP/TA) which is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. We obtain similar 
results in models 3 and 4 of Panel A of Table 8 when we per-
form the same analysis using the alternative lending activity 
proxy as the dependent variable, which is the total loans 
deflated by total assets (TL/TA).
Turning now to our findings using yearly bank-level 
data in Panel B of Tables 8, we observe that the interac-
tion between local public corruption (STATE COR) and the 
core deposits to total assets (CORE DEP/TA) is positive 
and significant at the 1% level in the models that use the 
ratio of total loans over total assets as dependent variable 
(see models 3 and 4 of Panel B of Table 8). Overall, these 
Table 7  The relationship between local public corruption and bank lending activity: accounting for loan demand
This table shows results from regressing bank lending volume classified by different types of loans on state-level public corruption after control-
ling for bank- and state-level characteristics (models 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Panel A and Panel B). Table 1 presents full definition and measurement 
details of all variables. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is represented by *, **, and ***, respectively. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The prefix (L.) denotes lagged variables
Frequency of 
data
Panel A Panel B
Quarterly Yearly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Ln commer-
cial loans
Ln real estate 
loans
Ln agric 
loans
Ln indiv. 
loans
Ln commer-
cial loans
Ln real estate 
loans
Ln agric 
loans
Ln indiv. loans
STATE COR − 0.0383*** − 0.0509*** 0.00453 0.00683 − 0.0364*** − 0.0400*** − 0.0223* 0.00267
(0.00752) (0.00597) (0.0124) (0.00838) (0.00800) (0.00595) (0.0126) (0.00814)
L.ROA − 0.565 0.701** 2.765** 0.935 0.502** 1.115*** 5.722*** 2.017***
(0.425) (0.354) (1.095) (0.723) (0.203) (0.346) (0.501) (0.753)
L.CASH 
RATIO
− 0.446*** − 0.600*** − 0.696*** − 0.156** − 0.200*** − 0.462*** − 0.612*** − 0.0520
(0.0632) (0.0570) (0.0912) (0.0640) (0.0655) (0.0521) (0.0940) (0.0629)
L.SIZE 0.959*** 0.987*** 0.786*** 0.667*** 0.839*** 0.900*** 0.707*** 0.564***
(0.0126) (0.00966) (0.0227) (0.0128) (0.0135) (0.0106) (0.0223) (0.0132)
L.E/TA − 0.00104 − 0.0141*** − 0.00201 − 0.0160*** 0.00675*** − 0.00588*** − 0.00469* − 0.00996***
(0.00132) (0.00172) (0.00253) (0.00136) (0.00162) (0.00170) (0.00269) (0.00150)
INCOME 1.215*** 0.604*** 0.358*** 1.419*** 0.796*** 0.660*** 0.520*** 1.474***
(0.0830) (0.0585) (0.124) (0.0840) (0.0931) (0.0605) (0.129) (0.0824)
UNEMP 0.00339 0.000976 − 0.0226*** − 0.0274*** 0.00148 − 0.00382** − 0.0242*** − 0.0256***
(0.00286) (0.00179) (0.00431) (0.00293) (0.00298) (0.00183) (0.00439) (0.00288)
POP − 2.267*** − 0.646*** − 1.045*** − 1.769*** − 1.652*** − 0.569*** − 1.413*** − 1.979***
(0.148) (0.0928) (0.204) (0.104) (0.158) (0.0942) (0.210) (0.130)
Constant 10.97*** − 2.217** 9.521*** 3.469*** 10.35*** − 3.648*** 12.76*** 7.020***
(1.774) (1.011) (2.333) (0.986) (1.953) (1.036) (2.396) (1.463)
Observations 453,629 649,421 518,100 649,674 136,947 200,899 161,114 200,946
R-squared 0.306 0.779 0.115 0.260 0.275 0.766 0.104 0.231
Number of 
banks
13,800 14,236 11,575 14,249 12,925 13,028 10,656 13,053
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter 
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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findings lend support to the H2 hypothesis, suggesting that 
banks that rely more on relationship-based lending could be 
affected less by the adverse effects of local public corrup-
tion, in terms of lending activity.
Further, in Table 9, we provide the results from the mod-
els that test the mediating effect of monitoring effort on bank 
lending activity. The findings from both the quarterly and 
Table 8  The relationship between local public corruption and bank lending activity: the mediating role of relationship-based lending
This table shows the role of relationship-based lending (CORE DEP/TA) in the association between bank lending volume (Ln Loans and TL/
TA) and state-level public corruption after controlling for bank- and state-level characteristics. Table 1 presents full definition and measurement 
details of all variables. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is represented by *, **, and ***, respectively. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The prefix (L.) denotes lagged variables
Frequency 
of data
Panel A Panel B
Quarterly Yearly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Ln loans Ln loans TL/TA TL/TA Ln loans Ln loans TL/TA TL/TA
STATE COR − 0.0426*** − 0.0223*** − 0.0372*** − 0.0254***
(0.0103) (0.00363) (0.0120) (0.00391)
L.COR 
DEP/TA
− 0.00179*** − 0.000875*** − 0.000767*** − 0.000269*** − 0.000603 − 0.000124 − 0.000689*** − 0.000392***
(0.000606) (1.00e − 04) (0.000193) (4.02e − 05) (0.000602) (0.000198) (0.000200) (7.17e − 05)
STATE 
COR* 
L.COR 
DEP/TA
0.00176** 0.000730*** 0.000963*** 0.000490*** 0.000972 − 0.000163 0.00111*** 0.000547***
(0.000786) (0.000209) (0.000269) (8.41e − 05) (0.000836) (0.000403) (0.000274) (0.000146)
L.ROA − 0.108 − 0.0128 0.0971 0.151*** 0.897*** 0.823*** 0.197** 0.185***
(0.168) (0.0347) (0.0848) (0.0140) (0.272) (0.0522) (0.0847) (0.0190)
L.CASH 
RATIO
− 0.655*** − 0.697*** − 0.272*** − 0.291*** − 0.477*** − 0.516*** − 0.193*** − 0.214***
(0.0462) (0.00627) (0.0109) (0.00252) (0.0399) (0.0129) (0.0117) (0.00468)
L.SIZE 0.975*** 0.979*** 0.00807*** 0.00981*** 0.884*** 0.888*** 0.00649*** 0.00876***
(0.00580) (0.000829) (0.00209) (0.000333) (0.00780) (0.00170) (0.00216) (0.000617)
L.E/TA − 0.00940*** − 0.0106*** − 0.00398*** − 0.00457*** − 0.00106 − 0.00232*** − 0.00347*** − 0.00408***
(0.00152) (0.000106) (0.000262) (4.26e − 05) (0.00126) (0.000230) (0.000320) (8.34e − 05)
INCOME 0.373*** 0.160*** 0.393*** 0.110***
(0.0346) (0.0136) (0.0362) (0.0145)
UNEMP − 0.00282** − 7.06e − 05 − 0.00741*** − 0.000478
(0.00119) (0.000457) (0.00118) (0.000478)
POP − 0.652*** − 0.302*** − 0.571*** − 0.236***
(0.0535) (0.0211) (0.0563) (0.0222)
Constant 3.377*** − 0.201*** 2.240*** 0.519*** 2.400*** 0.770*** 2.108*** 0.520***
(0.611) (0.0103) (0.241) (0.00415) (0.686) (0.0212) (0.253) (0.00769)
Observa-
tions
651,585 651,169 651,585 651,169 201,537 200,814 201,537 200,814
R2 0.845 0.980 0.237 0.726 0.800 0.974 0.236 0.735
Number of 
banks
14,277 14,277 14,277 14,277 13,069 13,069 13,069 13,069
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Year- Quar-
ter FE
Yes No Yes No No No No No
Year FE No No No No Yes No Yes No
State* Time 
FE
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
yearly specifications (see models 1–4 of Panel A and Panel 
B of Table 9, respectively) are in line with hypothesis H3, 
which posits that monitoring effort could weaken the adverse 
effects of local public corruption on bank lending activity. 
The interaction between local public corruption (STATE 
COR) and the monitoring effort proxy (SAL EX/TE) is posi-
tive and significant at least at the 5% level in all models.
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Overall, these findings provide empirical support to 
hypotheses H2 and H3, as we find that banks that engage in 
more relationship-based lending and in stronger monitor-
ing effort could increase their lending activity when local 
public corruption is high. As for the rest of our explanatory 
variables, the results are in line with those of our baseline 
regressions.
Main Robustness Analysis
Addressing Endogeneity
One of the challenges of our identification strategy is the 
potential endogeneity between bank lending activity and 
local public corruption. Endogeneity may be present for a 
Table 9  The relationship between local public corruption and bank lending activity: the mediating role of monitoring effort
This table shows the role of bank monitoring (L.SAL EX/TE) in the association between bank lending volume (Ln Loans and TL/TA) and state-
level public corruption after controlling for bank- and state-level characteristics. Table 1 presents full definition and measurement details of all 
variables. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is represented by *, **, and ***, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The prefix (L.) denotes lagged variables
Frequency of data Panel A Panel B
Quarterly Yearly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables _Ln loans Ln loans TL/TA TL/TA Ln loans Ln loans TL/TA TL/TA
STATE COR − 0.0471*** − 0.0208*** − 0.0955*** − 0.0350***
(0.0126) (0.00508) (0.0270) (0.00974)
L.SAL EX/TE 0.0473*** 0.0382*** 0.0187*** 0.0154*** 0.0191** 0.0192*** 0.00690** 0.00650***
(0.0133) (0.00112) (0.00536) (0.000451) (0.00955) (0.00135) (0.00328) (0.000491)
STATE COR* 
L.SAL EX/TE
0.0319** 0.0621*** 0.0126** 0.0221*** 0.0432*** 0.0433*** 0.0148** 0.0142***
(0.0153) (0.00293) (0.00616) (0.00118) (0.0167) (0.00351) (0.00599) (0.00128)
L.ROA − 0.0895 0.0260 0.105 0.168*** 0.893*** 0.825*** 0.190** 0.183***
(0.194) (0.0346) (0.0936) (0.0139) (0.278) (0.0521) (0.0883) (0.0189)
L.CASH RATIO − 0.664*** − 0.700*** − 0.276*** − 0.291*** − 0.478*** − 0.517*** − 0.196*** − 0.216***
(0.0452) (0.00620) (0.0109) (0.00249) (0.0396) (0.0127) (0.0117) (0.00463)
L.SIZE 0.987*** 0.989*** 0.0127*** 0.0131*** 0.894*** 0.898*** 0.0108*** 0.0124***
(0.00579) (0.000803) (0.00210) (0.000323) (0.00780) (0.00165) (0.00219) (0.000601)
L.E/TA − 0.00979*** − 0.0111*** − 0.00414*** − 0.00477*** − 0.00172 − 0.00302*** − 0.00367*** − 0.00429***
(0.00151) (0.000105) (0.000259) (4.24e − 05) (0.00125) (0.000230) (0.000316) (8.34e − 05)
INCOME 0.361*** 0.156*** 0.392*** 0.108***
(0.0344) (0.0135) (0.0363) (0.0144)
UNEMP − 0.00268** − 2.14e − 05 − 0.00759*** − 0.000488
(0.00117) (0.000452) (0.00116) (0.000473)
POP − 0.640*** − 0.298*** − 0.568*** − 0.234***
(0.0533) (0.0210) (0.0559) (0.0221)
Constant 3.266*** − 0.365*** 2.192*** 0.463*** 2.218*** 0.610*** 2.038*** 0.459***
(0.609) (0.00983) (0.239) (0.00395) (0.685) (0.0204) (0.253) (0.00741)
Observations 651,579 651,163 651,579 651,163 201,536 200,813 201,536 200,813
R-squared 0.846 0.980 0.241 0.728 0.801 0.975 0.239 0.737
Number of banks 14,277 14,277 14,277 14,277 13,069 13,069 13,069 13,069
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Year-Quarter FE Yes No Yes No No No No No
Year FE No No No No Yes No Yes No
State* Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
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number of reasons. The first is the potential for a feedback 
effect (i.e., reverse causality) from bank lending activity 
upon local public corruption. Access to credit could influ-
ence the propensity of local economic and political agents 
to participate in corruption-related activities. For example, 
bank credit may increase competition in the business sectors 
(Black and Strahan 2002) and, thus, reduce the rents of local 
firms. This could reduce the rewards from corruption and, 
consequently, the inclination of public officials to engage in 
corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1999). Moreover, Jha (2018) 
provides cross-country evidence that more autonomy con-
ferred to banks regarding lending decisions and lower entry 
barriers in the bank industry reduces corruption. This could 
be relevant in the US context because our sample encom-
passes the period after the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 that 
led to the abolishment of restrictions on interstate banking 
and branching. The second potential endogeneity concern 
is that of a potential omitted variable bias; Jha (2018) for 
instance shows that banking supervision has a negative 
association with corruption. Hence, bank supervision could 
relate to both lending and corruption. Despite the fact that 
US commercial banks need to abide by the same regula-
tions, nationally-chartered commercial banks are subject to 
supervision solely by federal regulators while state-chartered 
commercial banks are subject to the same by both federal 
and state supervisors.6 Agarwal et al. (2014) show that state 
supervisors are more lenient than their federal counterparts 
are in the enforcement of bank regulations. Thus, some het-
erogeneity in terms of bank supervision could be present in 
our sample.7
To address the above endogeneity concerns, we employ 
a two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable (IV) 
framework. To this aim, we need to find an appropriate 
instrument for local public corruption. In studying the role 
of corruption on the firm financial policy, Smith (2016) 
builds upon Campante and Do (2014), who show that iso-
lated state-capital cities exhibit a positive association with 
public corruption in the US states. The theoretical rationale 
is that state-capital isolation decreases the accountability of 
public officials (Wilson 1966; Maxwell and Winters 2005). 
Campante and Do (2014) provide empirical evidence of the 
accountability-related channels through which state-capital 
isolation induces public corruption. They show that local 
media coverage of state politics is lower when their reader-
ship is not concentrated around the state-capital. They also 
find that the further away individuals live from the state-cap-
ital, the less informed and interested they are in state politics 
and less likely to vote in state elections. Consequently, lower 
accountability of public officials enhances their opportuni-
ties and incentives to misuse the public office for private 
gain.8
Therefore, a potential instrument for local public corrup-
tion is a proxy for state-capital isolation. We obtain state-
capital isolation data from the study of Campante and Do 
(2014). We use the state-capital isolation value for the earli-
est year available in the study—i.e., 1920. This ranges from 
0 to 1 with lower (higher) values denoting higher (lower) 
capital isolation. We conjecture that state-capital isolation 
in 1920 will have a predictive power regarding the level of 
local (i.e., state-level) public corruption in the 1985–2013 
period (i.e., the inclusion restriction). At the same time, we 
assume that the necessary exclusion restriction is met. Why 
state-capital isolation in 1920 would affect the lending activ-
ity of banks directly in the period of the study is unclear, and 
is unlikely to be the case. The results of these 2SLS-IV esti-
mations regarding our main hypothesis H1 using quarterly 
frequency data are available in Panel A of Table 10.
The first-stage results in the lower part of model 1 and 
4 of Panel A of Table 10 show that the capital isolation 
variable in 1920 (CAPIS1920) has a negative and signifi-
cant association at the 1% level with local public corrup-
tion in the 1985–2013 period.9 Note that higher values of 
7 In addition to the instrumental variable analysis, we treat this con-
cern in several other ways. In our baseline models we use bank fixed 
effects, which account for bank charter type and, hence, the type of 
bank supervisors. We also perform additional estimations (available 
on request) that instead of bank fixed effects use bank charter type 
dummies. Furthermore, Agarwal et al. (2014) show that main reason 
that state bank supervisors are more lenient than their federal coun-
terparts is because they also take into account the local (i.e., state) 
economic conditions. In our baseline models we have used the unem-
ployment rate as a proxy for the local economic conditions as well 
as the state coincident index. Hence, these models also take into 
account the main source of the leniency of the state supervisors. It 
is also important to note that Agarwal et  al. (2014) test and reject 
the hypothesis that the leniency of state supervisors could stem from 
local public corruption.
9 In the first stage we also include all the other control variables but, 
for the convenience to the reader, report only the instrument results. 
Note also that the in the models that use capital isolation as an instru-
ment we do not include state-fixed effects because capital isolation is 
state-specific and time-invariant. Instead, we use region-fixed effects 
based on the US census classification.
8 The extant literature provides additional empirical support the rela-
tionship of both of these accountability-reducing mechanisms with 
corruption [see, for example, Brunetti and Weder (2003) and Costas- 
Pérez et al. (2012)]. Brunetti and Weder (2003) argue that local media 
coverage increases the costs incurred from public officials in engag-
ing in corruption-related activities because of higher chance of detec-
tion and punishment. Costas- Pérez et  al. (2012) provide evidence 
that voters react to corruption scandals by significantly decreasing the 
chance of public officials involved in such cases being re-elected to 
office. They also find that local media coverage enhances this effect.
6 Nationally-chartered banks are supervised by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) which is a federal supervisor. 
Both state and federal supervisors (the Federal Reserve or the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation) supervise state-chartered banks. 
During the period of our sample (i.e., since the 1980 s) different char-
ters do not imply significant regulatory or activities permission differ-
ences. For an overview of the bank supervision system in the US see 
Agarwal et al. (2014).
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10 Vadlamannati and Cooray (2017) provide similar cross-country 
evidence that the adoption of FOIA laws reduces corruption with a 
lag (i.e., in the longer term).Th
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the CAPIS1920 variable denote less state-capital isolation. 
Thus, as expected, higher levels of state-capital isolation 
relate to a higher level of public corruption. Therefore, the 
capital isolation variable in 1920 is a strong instrument for 
local public corruption in the 1985–2013 period. Further-
more, the validity of the capital isolation instrument is sup-
ported by the under-identification LM test (UIT) and the 
weak identification Wald F-Test (WIT). The results from the 
second stage (see the upper part of models 1 and 4 of Panel 
A of Table 10) lend further empirical support to the findings 
of the baseline models. In support of hypothesis H1, in these 
models, we find that local public corruption exerts a negative 
and significant effect at the 1% level on the two proxies of 
lending activity. The results from the analogous models that 
employ yearly frequency data are similar (see models 1 and 
4 of Panel B of Table 10).
In an effort to study the robustness of the above conclu-
sion to the instrument chosen, we also adopt a different IV 
approach, where we consider 2SLS-IV estimations based 
upon a time-variant instrument. Closely following Cordis 
and Warren (2014), we use the change of the strength of the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) laws in each state. The 
FOIA laws facilitate the access of the public to information 
about government activities. Hence, FOIA laws reduce local 
public corruption by reducing the incentive of government 
employees and officials to engage in corruption-related ille-
gal activities due to more intense public scrutiny. Cordis and 
Warren (2014) provide empirical evidence to support this 
argument. They quantify the strength of the FOIA laws in 
each US state by using a 0–10 annual score for the 1986 to 
2009 period. Next, according to the strength of this score, 
they classify states into weak FOIA laws states (score of 
six or less) and strong FOIA laws states (score of seven or 
more). Subsequently, they show that corruption decreases 
in the states that transition from weak to strong FOIA laws. 
However, this effect is evident after seven years. In the short 
term, after the transition from weak to strong FOIA laws, the 
conviction rate increases because of a higher possibility of 
corruption-related crime detection in the previous years. The 
reduction in local public corruption occurs in the long-term 
(i.e., after seven years) when the negative effect of FOIA 
laws on the incentives of government employees and offi-
cials to engage in corruption activities offsets the short-term 
detection effect.10
We use the evidence of Cordis and Warren (2014) and, 
similar to Huang and Yuan (2019), we employ—as an instru-
ment of public corruption—a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one for the years beyond the seventh year after a 
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state has transitioned from weak to strong FOIA laws while 
it takes the value of zero up to the seventh year after the 
transition. We expect this transition dummy to exert a neg-
ative effect on local public corruption (i.e., the inclusion 
restriction), while it is not likely that this transition, which 
occurred at least seven years ago, would directly affect the 
contemporaneous bank lending activity (i.e., the exclusion 
restriction).11 Hence, we employ the sample of banks that 
are located in the states that have experienced an FOIA laws 
transition and run the 2SLS-IV estimations. This reduces 
the number of observations because our instrument, by con-
struction, applies to the states that have experienced such a 
transition in the period of the study.12 The results from the 
estimations that use quarterly data are available in models 
2 and 5 of Panel A of Table 10. Despite the difference in 
the approach, the main message conveyed by the previous 
IV exercise holds. As expected, the first-stage results in 
the lower part of these models show that the FOIA tran-
sition dummy exerts a negative and significant at the 1% 
level effect on public corruption. We also find evidence in 
support of the validity of the FOIA laws transition dummy 
instrument through the under-identification LM test (UIT) 
and the weak identification Wald F-Test (WIT). The second-
stage results (see the upper part of the models 2 and 5 of 
Panel A of Table 10) show, in support of hypothesis H1 that 
the instrumented local public corruption variable exerts a 
negative and significant effect at the 1% level on the two 
proxies of lending activity. The findings from the models 
that use yearly frequency are similar (see models 2 and 5 of 
Panel B of Table 10).
As a final IV exercise, we provide results from models 
that employ both the instruments. This exercise is important 
as it allows us to perform also the test for over-identifica-
tion by Hansen (OIT). The results from these estimations 
are available in models 3 and 6 of Panel A and Panel B of 
Table 10 for quarterly and yearly data, respectively. The first-
stage findings in the lower part of these models show that 
both these two instruments retain their negative and signifi-
cant effect at the 1% level on local public corruption. Fur-
thermore, the validity of the instruments is also supported 
by the insignificant p-value of the Hansen over-identification 
test (OIT) in three out of the four models. The second-stage 
findings (see the upper part of models 3 and 6 of Panel A and 
Panel B of Table 10) show that the effect of the instrumented 
local public corruption on the two proxies of lending activity 
remains negative and significant at the 1% level.
Overall, the results of the 2SLS-IV estimations lend addi-
tional empirical support to hypothesis H1, which posits that 
local public corruption would exert a negative effect on bank 
lending activity.13 Furthermore, they provide evidence that 
this association has a causal link.
Perceptions‑Based Measures of Local Public 
Corruption
We also perform estimations that employ perception-
based measures of local public corruption. Given that the 
conviction-based measure of corruption gauges the level 
of exposed corruption in a state, using perception-based 
measures could further enrich the analysis. To this end, we 
use three perception-based measures of corruption at the 
state level. These are the illegal corruption index for 2014 
by Dincer and Johnston (2015), the inverse (by multiplying 
with-1) “State Integrity Index” developed by the Center of 
Public Integrity in 2015, and the index of Boylan and Long 
(2003). The full definitions of these measures are in Table 1.
These three perception-based corruption measures are 
available at one point in time. This means that they do not 
exhibit time variability. Thus, we follow Smith (2016) and 
11 One potential caveat is that the transition dummy of the state 
FOIA laws, which has at least a seven-year lag from contemporane-
ous lending, might correlate with the contemporaneous strength of 
the state FOIA laws. Because of the negligible state ownership of the 
US banking sector and because FOIA laws are specific to the public 
sector it is not likely that loan officers will take into account the con-
temporaneous FOIA laws in a stand-alone manner when they decide 
to grant credit. However, they could take them into account in cases 
where a loan application involves public officials misusing the public 
office (e.g., through bribery and nepotism). In such cases, we conjec-
ture that the involvement of a public official in this illegal transaction 
would still constitute a case of corruption. However, we err on the 
side of caution and assume that loan officers would take into account 
the contemporaneous strength of the FOIA laws, which could corre-
late with our instrument, independently from the contemporaneous 
level of public corruption. We treat this issue in two ways. Firstly, we 
run models that include the contemporaneous strength of the FOIA 
laws and the results of the 2SLS-IV estimation still hold. Secondly, 
we use models that only comprise the contemporaneous strength of 
the FOIA laws together with bank, state and time effects as explana-
tory variables. Then, we use the residuals of this model as depend-
ent variable in the 2SLS-IV estimations. The results are robust to this 
exercise and available on request. We thank an anonymous referee for 
raising this issue and motivating us to perform these additional tests.
12 These states are the following: Idaho (ID), Nebraska (NE), New 
Hampshire (NH), New Jersey (NJ), New Mexico (NM), North Dakota 
(ND), Pennsylvania (PA), South Carolina (SC), Texas (TX), Utah 
(UT), Washington (WA) and West Virginia (WV). For further details 
see Cordis and Warren (2014) and the associated Internet Appendix 
of their article.
13 We note the larger coefficients in the 2SLS-IV models of Table 10 
in comparison with the baseline models of Table 5. This is similar to 
other studies that examine the effects of US local public corruption 
on firm outcomes (e.g., Dass et al. 2016; Smith 2016). However, we 
can still infer from the 2SL-IV models of Table 10 a significant nega-
tive causal effect of local public corruption on bank lending activity. 
For the economic interpretation of the effect, we err on the side of 
caution and use the more conservative results from the baseline mod-
els in Table 5.
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14 We also perform additional tests. We estimate models with yearly 
frequency data. The results from this analysis, available upon request, 
show that two of the three perceptions-based measures of corruption 
have a negative and significant effect on lending activity. We also per-
form estimations for the post-1999 period, given that the three per-
ceptions-based measures reflect post-1999 perceptions, and the find-
ings are consistent.
use their values for the whole sample of the study. Further-
more, since these indices are both state-specific and time-
invariant, the models that use them as explanatory variables 
employ regional fixed effects, as defined by the US census, 
instead of bank- or state-fixed effects. The results from these 
estimations are available in Table 11.
In models 1–6 in Table 11, we find that all three percep-
tion-based indices of local public corruption (DJ, INVINT, 
and BL) exhibit a negative and significant relationship with 
bank lending activity, providing further empirical support 
to hypothesis H1. Next, we test the effect of the interaction 
terms between the three perception-based measures of local 
public corruption and the relationship-based lending and 
monitoring effort proxies on lending activity. In the models 
that employ the interaction terms, which are time-variant, 
we also include bank and state-fixed effects and drop the 
main perception-based indices that are state-specific and 
time-invariant. The results from this exercise are available in 
models 7–12 of Table 11. Overall, we find evidence in sup-
port of hypothesis H3 regarding monitoring effort. In three 
models, the interaction between the perception-based meas-
ures of local public corruption and the monitoring effort 
proxy (SAL EX/TE) has a positive and significant relation-
ship with the lending activity variables (see models 7, 8 and 
12 of Table 11).
Finally, because the perception-based measures are time-
invariant, we also estimate models that use the cross-sec-
tional average of the bank-specific and state-specific vari-
ables across the whole period of the study. The results from 
this exercise are consistent with the findings of Table 11 and, 
due to space constraints, are available in Table IA.8 of the 
Internet Appendix.14
Summary of Additional Robustness Tests 
and Further Analysis
Additional Robustness Tests
We perform several additional robustness checks. We repli-
cate the models of the main analysis with an alternative way 
of obtaining yearly frequency data. In this respect, we fol-
low Casu et al. (2013) and average the quarterly data on an 
annual frequency to build a dataset of yearly observations. 
We also take into account that the yearly public corruption 
measure may include some noise in terms of its time vari-
ation (Campante and Do 2014). Hence, we provide estima-
tions that use the time-series average of the conviction-based 
state-level corruption and the national rank of this cross-time 
average. We also replicate the models of the main analysis 
by clustering the standard errors by both state and year, as in 
Smith (2016), because the main measure of public corrup-
tion exhibits both yearly and state variation. Finally, we also 
estimate models that examine the effect of public corruption 
on lending growth. The results from these additional robust-
ness exercises are generally consistent with the results of the 
main analysis. The Internet Appendix presents and discusses 
these additional tests.
Further Analysis: Heterogeneity by Bank Size, Time 
Period and Geographic Focus of Banks
We also perform some heterogeneity analysis (we present 
and discuss these results in the Internet Appendix). We show 
that the negative effect of local public corruption on lending 
activity is more evident for smaller banks. This is consistent 
with the view that smaller banks have a strong focus on the 
local credit market. Similarly, the benefits of relationship 
lending and monitoring effect, in terms of alleviating the 
negative effect of local public corruption on lending, are 
more pronounced for smaller banks. We also find that the 
negative effect of corruption on lending persists in the period 
after the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 that abolished regulatory 
restrictions on interstate banking and interstate branching. 
However, this effect is more evident for banks with single-
state operations, which represent the large majority of US 
commercial banks. These findings are consistent with previ-
ous evidence which shows that, even after the deregulation 
in geographic restrictions, most US banks still concentrate 
their business in their home state (Goetz et al. 2016).
Conclusion
The literature that explores the effects of corruption on 
economic outcomes mostly focusses on emerging and less 
developed economies, where public corruption is considered 
more prevalent in comparison with more advanced econo-
mies. This is also the case when it comes to the investigation 
of corruption-related issues in bank lending. Recently, how-
ever, a growing stream of research focusses on the effects 
of public corruption in advanced economies such as the US 
and provides evidence that it reduces firm transparency and 
performance (e.g., Dass et al. 2016; Brown et al. 2019).
In a sensible extension of this literature, we investigate 
the effect of local public corruption on the lending activity 
of US banks. We find that public corruption exerts a negative 
and significant effect on lending. These results indicate that, 
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by inducing information asymmetry in the lending market, 
public corruption discourages the provision of bank credit. 
Therefore, reduced access to bank credit could be a channel 
through which public corruption could hamper local eco-
nomic development even in very advanced economies such 
as the US.
We also find that relationship lending and monitoring 
lessen the negative association between public corruption 
and lending activity. These findings further corroborate that 
local public corruption prompts the information asymme-
try concerns of lenders. To some extent, banks that place 
emphasis on acquiring information on borrowers and engage 
in stronger monitoring effort could overcome the informa-
tion asymmetry that stems from public corruption. Hence, 
from a managerial standpoint, such bank strategies could be 
beneficial for banks located in high public corruption areas.
From a public policy standpoint, one could view the 
findings of this study in conjunction with the studies which 
show that public corruption exerts negative effects on the 
outcomes of US firms (e.g., Dass et al. 2016; Brown et al. 
2019). Combating public corruption could not only directly 
improve the performance of US businesses but could also 
facilitate, through a positive spillover to the banking sector, 
access to credit. Overall, these findings endorse the need to 
reshape the policy agenda regarding corruption in the US; 
and also in other very advanced economies. It is important to 
revisit the view that public corruption is a source of harmful 
economic outcomes mostly in less developed and emerging 
economies and not as much in very advanced economies.
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